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INTRODUCTION
Recent events have intensified the battle between those who fear
"selling the Russians the rope they will hang us with"1 and those who
accuse the Reagan administration of waging "economic warfare" against
the Soviet Union.2 For much of 1987 and 1988, government officials and
commentators have been debating how to withhold sensitive technology
from potential foes of the U.S. while allowing U.S. exporters to succeed
in world markets. Some have stressed that the West's qualitative edge in
defense technology is slipping 3 and have pointed angrily to recent spec-
tacular failures in the enforcement of multilateral export controls4 as ex-
amples of what export control "reform" will achieve. Others have
emphasized our deteriorating balance of trade, especially in high-technol-
ogy products, 5 and have blamed autarkic and capricious export licensing
1. See Gershman, Selling Them the Rope: Business & the Soviets, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1979,
at 35, 35. As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn describes, the saying comes from Lenin's belief that
the Western Capitalists would do anything to strengthen the economy of the USSR. They
will compete with each other to sell [the USSR] goods cheaper and sell them quicker, so
that the Soviets will buy from one rather than the other.... [I]n a difficult moment, at a
party meeting in Moscow, he said: "Comrades, don't panic, when things go very hard for
us, we will give a rope to the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie will hang itself."
Then, Karl Radek. ... who was a very resourceful wit, said: "Vladimir Ilyich, but
where are we going to get enough rope to hang the whole bourgeoisie?" Lenin effortlessly
replied: "They'll supply us with it."
Speech by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to AFL-CIO (June 30, 1975), quoted in Gershman, supra, at 35.
See generally Kirkwood, Inside the Red-Trade Lobby, NAT'L REV., Apr. 29, 1988, at 35 (warning
that increased U.S.-USSR trade would allow USSR to undermine U.S. military expenditures).
2. See Bonker Outlines Plans Following EAA Bill, Suggests Court Suit Over DoD Review Move,
2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 952, 952 (July 24, 1985) (quoting D. Bonker, Remarks to U.S. Chamber
of Commerce).
3. See, eg., Perle, Technology Security, National Security, and U.S. Competitiveness, 3 IssuEs
Sci. & TECH. 106, 107-09 (1986) (The Soviets have narrowed the U.S. military technology advan-
tage, in part by using "Western technology to subsidize their military R&D program.").
4. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Bonker, Protecting Economic Interests, 3 IssUES Sci. & TECH. 96, 96 (1986) (not-
ing in prologue that U.S. high-technology trade surplus dropped from $26 billion to $7 billion be-
tween 1980 and 1985); see also PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF NAT'L SEC. CONTROLS ON INT'L
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, COMM. ON SCIENCE, ENG'G, AND PUB. POLICY, NAT'L ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENG'G, INST. OF MEDICINE, BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTER-
EST: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CONTROLS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC COMPETITION 123-
24 (1987) [hereinafter NATIONi L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES] (discussing how U.S. export controls
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practices under the Export Administration Act (EAA) 6 for stifling U.S.
exporters' competitiveness. In subtitle II(D) of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988 OTCA),7 the two sides have reached
a settlement, albeit an uneasy and possibly short-lived one.8
The balance that U.S. export controls should strike between trade
competitiveness and national security9 is not a new issue; indeed, wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the executive branch's version of that bal-
ance 0 led Congress to amend the federal export control laws in 197911
and 1985.12 In the period leading up to the Export Administration
disadvantage U.S. firms and help their competitors in CoCom and non-CoCom countries); infra note
34 and accompanying text (describing CoCom).
6. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2419 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) [cited hereinafter as EAA].
7. Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 2401-2447, 102 Stat. 1107, 1347-70 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 50 U.S.C. app. and at 19 U.S.C. § 1864) [cited hereinafter as 1988 OTCA]; see infra note
180 (citing bills that gave rise to 1988 OTCA); see also infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text
(discussing history of 1988 OTCA).
8. See infra notes 199-205, 222, and accompanying text.
9. The EAA actually implements three kinds of controls, not all of which deal explicitly with
national security:
(I) foreign policy controls, which seek "to further significantly the foreign policy of the United
States or to fulfill its declared international obligations," EAA § 3(2)(B), 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2402(2)(B) (1982); see also id. § 6, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (Supp. III 1985) (prescribing foreign
policy controls);
(2) short supply controls, which seek "to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of
scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of foreign demand," id.
§ 3(2)(C), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(C) (1982); see also id. § 7, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985) (prescribing short supply controls); and
(3) national security controls, which seek "to restrict the export of goods and technology which
would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combi-
nation of countries which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United
States," id. § 3(2)(A), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A) (1982); see also id. § 5, 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2404 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (prescribing national security controls).
However, the genesis of U.S. export controls at the outset of the cold war, see A. LOWENFELD,
TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS §§ 1.1, 2.1 (1977), and their application to such foreign
policy purposes as protesting the Soviet-directed crackdown in Poland and averting European de-
pendence on Soviet natural gas, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, TECH-
NOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE: AN UPDATE 8 (1983), reflect the fact that a broad conception of
national security underlies the entire EAA. This Note, in contrast, focuses on national security
export controls in the narrow sense defined by EAA § 5, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
10. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, EXPORT CONTROL REGULA-
TION COULD BE REDUCED WITHOUT AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY 13, 22 (1982) (report, is-
sued at request of Sens. Gan and Byrd, recommended eliminating licensing requirements for low-
technology items, as well as changing export licensing review process).
11. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) [cited hereinafter as 1979 EAA].
12. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (codified
in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. III 1985)) [cited hereinafter as 1985
EAAA]. For a brief discussion of the events that led up to the 1979 and 1985 enactments, see
Gonzalez, How to Increase Technology Exports Without Risking National Security-An In-Depth
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Amendments Act of 1985 (1985 EAAA), 13 Congress explicitly balanced
trade promotion and national security objectives by weighing the roles of
the trade-oriented Department of Commerce (Commerce) and the secur-
ity-oriented Department of Defense (DoD) in the national security ex-
port control process. The EAA had lapsed in 1983,14 and the House and
Senate bills to renew it differed on one important point: whether DoD
should have power to review and veto requests to export high-technology
items to "non-controlled" (i.e., free-world) 15 countries. The Senate bill
explicitly authorized such DoD review, 16 but the House refused to insert
a like provision into its bill.17 The controversy ended in an unstable com-
promise when the President directed that DoD undertake review. Con-
gress, satisfied that some decision had been made, left the 1985 EAAA
silent on the matter. 8
Two years later, the 100th Congress, still struggling to balance pol-
icy objectives in export controls, decided to take action before the EAA's
scheduled expiration in September 1989.19 The House and Senate again
differed on whether DoD should review applications for free-world high-
technology exports,20 but this time the House took the offensive, seeking
to legislate away the DoD review ordered by the President in 1985.21 In
the end, the House failed to secure inclusion of its provision in the 1988
OTCA. Instead, the OTCA blends Congress's continued refusal to
amend the key statutory provision on DoD free-world export license re-
Look at the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, 8 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 399,
411-14 (1986).
13. Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. at 120.
14. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (1982) (superseded 1985).
15. Cf. EAA §§ 16(6), 5(b), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2415(6), 2404(b) (Supp. III 1985) (defining "con-
trolled countries"). "Free-world," "non-controlled-country," and "West-West" denote exports to
countries other than those that the EAA defines as "controlled."
16. See S. 979, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(5)-(7), 130 CONG. REc. S2255 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1984)
[hereinafter S. 979] (proposing to amend 50 U.S.C. § 2409(g) (1982)). S. 979 was passed on March
1, 1984, the day before it was reprinted. See 130 CONG. REc. 82143 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984).
17. See H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Extension and Revision of the Export
Administration Act of 1979: Hearings and Markup on H.R. 3231 Before the House Comm. on For-
eign Affairs and Its Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.
1459-525 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 3231]; see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text;
see also Gonzalez, supra note 12, at 411-13.
18. See Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. at 120; infra note 85 and accompanying text.
19. See EAA § 20, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (Supp. III 1985).
20. Compare infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text (discussing House's position) with infra
notes 193-98 and accompanying text (discussing Senate's position). See generally White, Negotiating
and the Congressional Conference Proces." A Case Study of the Export Administration Act & the
Omnibus Trade Bill, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 333, 336-37 (1988) (explaining House's and
Senate's negotiating positions on EAA reform in general).
21. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
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view, EAA section 10(g), 2 2 with legislative history that acknowledges,
without resolving, the question of how much DoD license review the
EAA really authorizes. The answer to that question affects the legality
of the President's 1985 order.23
This Note24 addresses DoD's role in national security export con-
trols25 on "dual-use" goods, 26 technologies, and data.27 Focusing on the
22. EAA § 10(g), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (amended 1988) (1979
version reprinted infra note 55); see infra note 201 and accompanying text (explaining the 100th
Congress's failure to materially amend the section).
23. See infra notes 122-30, 220-21, and accompanying text. The advent of limited judicial re-
view under the EAA, see 1988 OTCA, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2428(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1361-62 (to
be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2412(c)-(d)), may allow the courts to decide the constitutionality of the
1985 directive. See also infra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing suggestion that aggrieved
exporters challenge directive).
24. The period since 1979 has seen a flood of scholarly and practical writing on export controls,
much of which has concerned the U.S.'s extraterritorial application of foreign policy controls, a
policy that has irritated the U.S.'s European allies and that commentators frequently say violates
international law. See, eg., Marcuss & Mathias, U.S. Foreign Policy Export Controls: Do They Pass
Muster Under International Law?, 2 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 1, 17-28 (1984) (arguing that the U.S.
lacks extraterritorial jurisdiction to impose export controls).
In contrast, most books and articles published since the 1985 EAAA's enactment focus on
national security controls; many of them mention the section 10(g) issue analyzed here. For authori-
ties, not cited elsewhere in this Note, that discuss U.S. export controls since the 1985 EAAA, see
generally BUSINESs-HIGHER EDUC. FORUM, EXPORT CONTROLS: THE NEED TO BALANCE NA-
TIONAL OBJECTIvES 43 (1986); THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1985 AND ITS RAMIFICA-
TIONS (1985); PRACTISING LAW INST., COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS (1986); Abbott,
Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and Extraterritorial Trade Controls, LAW & CNTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1987, at 117; Blair, Export Controls on Nonmilitary Goods and Technology: Are We Penaliz-
ing the Soviets or Ourselves?, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J 363 (1986); Levine, Technology Transfer: Export
Controls Versus Free Trade, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 373 (1986); Nollen, Business Costs and Business
Polley for Export Controls, J. INT'L BUS. STUD., Spring 1987, at 1; Note, High Technology Warfare:
The Export Administration Act Amendments of 1985 and the Problem of Foreign Reexport, 18
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 663 (1986); Recent Development, Export Controls--Export Administra-
tion Amendments Act of 1985, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 259 (1986).
25. "National security" export controls are those created by EAA §§ 3(2)(A), 5, 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2402(2)(A), 2404 (1982 & Supp. iii 1985).
National security controls aim only to stop potential enemies from receiving or easily diverting
legal exports of sensitive items. The Soviet bloo's other main-and arguably most important-tech-
nology acquisition method, espionage, is not the target of the Export Administration Act. Cf DoD,
SOVIET ACQUISITION OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WESTERN TECHNOLOGY: AN UPDATE 11-27
(1985) (discussing Soviet acquisition methods and their relative importance).
26. "Dual-use" items are commercial goods, technologies, and data that could make a signifi-
cant, but indirect, contribution to a potential foe's military capabilities. These items are the focus of
the EAA, and hence of this Note. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 80-82
(explaining characteristics and regulation of dual-use items). Items with direct military application
are controlled by the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2778-2780 (West Supp. 1988),
which is implemented by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1-130.17
(1988).
27. This Note does not discuss recent initiatives to restrict the Soviet blocs access to U.S.
financing. See, e.g., S. 786, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S3522-23 (daily ed. Mar. 19,
1987); S. 812, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S3686 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1985) (proposing to
restrict transfers of capital to "the Soviet Union and its allies"); see also Omnibus Trade Legislation
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policy aspects, legislative history, and constitutionality of the "section
10(g) issue," the Note:
(1) sketches the history of the EAA and the export licensing process
that it implements;
(2) reviews the events and debate that led to the 1985 EAAA's position
on DoD review of free-world export license applications;
(3) evaluates the uneasy compromise wrought by executive action and
congressional silence in 1985, and the constitutional status of
DoD's export license review program since then (leaving the 1988
OTCA aside);
(4) considers how the DoD/Commerce export license review process is
working, as evidenced by two government-sponsored studies, recent
developments in export control enforcement, and testimony before
the 99th and 100th Congresses; and
(5) examines the development of the 1988 OTCA's provisions on EAA
section 10(g), and what those provisions reveal about the state of
congressional intent regarding DoD free-world license review.
This Note stresses the costs and confusion produced by the ambiguity of
EAA section 10(g), and tries to resolve the confusion by clarifying the
statutory and constitutional authority for DoD review.
I. HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CONTROLS
U.S. peacetime export controls on dual-use items emerged in the late
1940s, when the U.S. and its NATO allies were beginning to rely on
superior military technology to offset the Soviet Union's quantitative
strengths.28 The controls found expression in the Export Control Act of
1949,29 which reflected a policy of "economic containment. '30 At the
on National Security Export Controls (VoL II): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-9 (1986)
[hereinafter April 1986 Hearings] (statement of Roger W. Robinson, Jr., Senior Director from 1982
to 1985 for International Economic Affairs, National Security Council).
28. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 72-73 (discussing historical back-
ground of Export Control Act of 1949); Perle, supra note 3, at 107:
Because we are democracies and consumer-oriented societies, we cannot match our Soviet
adversaries numerically-soldier for soldier, tank for tank, or aircraft for aircraft. But in
scores of programs-weapons systems, communications, intelligence, and warning-we
can use the technological edge provided by the brains and organizing ability of Western
scientists, engineers and businessmen to offset their large numbers.
29. Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7; see also Berman & Garson, United States
Export Controls--Past, Present, and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 791, 792 (1967) (discussing the
history of the enactment of the Act).
30. Comment, The Export Administration Act of 1979: Latest Statutory Resolution of the
"Right to Export" Versus National Security and Foreign Policy Controls, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 255,258(1981). "Economic containment" denotes a policy of husbanding strategically important
items to maintain a technological advantage over the Soviet bloc. Cf Perle, supra note 3, at 107-09
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time, the U.S. enjoyed a near-monopoly on advanced technology l and
thus was able to maintain the kinds of broad controls imposed during
World War 11.32 Those controls imposed unilateral checks on goods and
technologies that the U.S. alone had, and vigorously restricted the reex-
port of such goods.3 3 Realizing that its allies could undermine U.S. ex-
port controls by freely exporting their own sensitive goods, the U.S.
secured the allies' cooperation through the informal Coordinating Com-
mittee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), formed in 1949. 34 In
addition, under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the
Battle Act),35 Congress promised to cut off all economic aid to any coun-
try that leaked controlled items.36
Two decades later, after multiple extensions of the Export Control
Act,3 7 Congress liberalized export controls under the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1969 (1969 EAA). 38 The Act's name change, as well as its
new provisions, indicating that "trade with all countries, Communist in-
cluded, [is] beneficial to the U.S. ''39 and recognizing the costs of excessive
controls,4 reflected hopes for d6tente and expanded West-East trade.
This step coincided with the end of complete U.S. dominance in dual-use
technologies.41
(explaining role of technological strength in Western defense and expressing concern that West is
losing high-technology edge).
31. Murphy & Downey, National Security, Foreign Policy and Individual Rights: The Quan-
dary of United States Export Controls, 30 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 791, 792 (1981); see also NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 68 n.4, 59-68 (defining high-technology trade and discuss-
ing scope of and reasons for U.S.'s decline as high-technology leader).
32. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 73. The wartime export control laws
allowed an embargo of almost anything that the President declared to be military-related. See id. at
72-73.
33. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 73.
34. Comment, COCOM Limitations on the Effectiveness of Multilateral Export Controls, 1983
WIs. INT'L L.J. 106, 108-109. CoCom includes Japan and all NATO countries except Iceland. Id.
See generally Bertsch, U.S. Export Controls, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
FER: THE STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF EAsT-WEST TRADE 127-31 (G. Bertsch & J. McIntyre eds.
1983).
35. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, ch. 575, 65 Stat. 644 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 1611-1613d (1976)) (superseded 1979).
36. See Comment, supra note 34, at 109 n.14.
37. See Joint Resolution of May 16, 1951, ch. 83, 65 Stat. 43; Act of June 16, 1953, ch. 116, 67
Stat. 62; Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 473, § 1, 70 Stat. 407; Act of June 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-466,
72 Stat. 220; Act of May 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-464,74 Stat. 130; Act of July 1, 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-515, § 1, 76 Stat. 127; Act of June 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-63, § 1, 79 Stat. 209.
38. Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420(1982
& Supp. III 1985)) (emphasis added).
39. Gonzalez, supra note 12, at 408.
40. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 75.
41. See id. In fact, a 1977 amendment required decontrol of items that foreign suppliers could
provide in "significant quantities and comparable... quality." Export Administration Amendments
of 1977, Pub, L. No. 95-52, see. 103(a)(3), § 4(b)(2)(B), 91 Stat. 235, 236; cf EAA § 4(c), 50 U.S.C.
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In the late 1970s, recognizing that the hortatory 1969 EAA had ac-
complished little permanent decontrol, 42 U.S. exporters importuned
Congress for further changes.43 A sweeping amendment in 1979 ad-
dressed their concerns.44 The Export Administration Act of 1979 (1979
EAA) made both symbolic changes, such as a "Declaration of Policy"
that put a priority on exporters' needs45 and new provisions for exporters
to make their opinions known, 46 and substantive changes, including lim-
its on the scope of goods 47 and technologies48 controlled.
Despite these liberalizations, neither the 1969 or 1979 amendments,
nor the 1985 EAAA, changed certain prominent features of the national
security export control scheme. These features include:
(1) exemption of the rulemaking and enforcement process from the ju-
dicial review requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act;49
(2) short duration of each EAA reenactment, which gives Congress fre-
quent opportunities to rethink its earlier policy judgments; 50 and
(3) broad delegation to the President of authority to shape, administer,
and enforce an export licensing regime.5 1 The President, in turn,
has delegated nearly all of this authority to Commerce.52
app. § 2403(c) (1982) (foreign availability decontrol provision of 1979 EAA, later amended in 1985
EAAA, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 104(c), 99 Stat. at 123).
42. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 74-75.
43. See Gonzalez, supra note 12, at 409-10. The exporters' concerns extended to foreign policy
controls as well, in the wake of President Carter's controversial initiatives. Id. at 409 & n.25.
44. 1979 EAA, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503.
45. Id. § 3(10), 93 Stat. at 505.
46. Id. § 5(h), 93 Stat. at 510 (facilitating creation of "Technical Advisory Committees").
47. Id. § 5(c), 93 Stat. at 507 (defining goods constituting "Control List").
48. Id. § 5(d), 93 Stat. at 508 (limiting export controls on technologies to "Militarily Critical
Technologies").
49. EAA § 13(a)-(b), (e), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(a)-(b), (e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (amended
1988) (prescribing exemption from Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551, 553-559, 701-
706 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988), and imposing substitute appeal provisions). The lack of judicial
review has helped to prevent resolution of the Executive's and Congress's dispute over section 10(g).
The advent of judicial review under the 1988 OTCA, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2428, 102 Stat. 1107,
1361-62 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(c)-(d)), may allow the kind of definitive resolution
discussed infra notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
50. EAA § 20, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (Supp. III 1985) (prescribing four-year validity period for
current statute) (extended by one year in 1988 OTCA, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2431, 102 Stat. at
1362); ef supra note 37 (showing frequency of congressional reauthorization of export controls be-
tween 1949 and 1969).
51. See Berman & Garson, supra note 29, at 792 ("Probably no single piece of legislation gives
more power to the President to control American commerce."). See generally NATIONAL ACAD-
EMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 72-73.
52. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,214, 3 C.F.R. 256 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403
(1982). Commerce exercises its delegated authority through the Export Administration Regulations,
15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399 (1988) [cited hereinafter as EAR].
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Moreover, the mechanics of U.S. national security export controls 53 have
remained stable since the inception of "economic containment" in the
1940s. 54
II. EVENTS LEADING TO THE 1985 EAAA's PoSITIoN
ON DOD REVIEW
A. Early Developments Under the 1979 EAA.
At the beginning of the Reagan administration, EAA section 10(g) 55
53. See Woodward, Commerce Simplifies Export Licensing, Bus. AM., June 8, 1987, at 2, 3-8.
See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 75-97 & figs. 4-1, 4-2, 4-4
(flowcharts and description of license submittal and review process). In general terms, the EAR
require federal export licenses for all exports of goods and technical data to every country except
Canada. See EAR, 15 C.F.R. § 370 supp. 1; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at
82. The few exceptions to the no-controls policy for Canada appear in EAR, 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4(c),
379.5(e), 385.6.
Most U.S. exports receive "general licenses," which authorize shipment of less-sensitive goods
to less-sensitive destinations. Id. § 371.1; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, U.S. CONGRESS, MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM ISSUE BRIEF: EXPORT CONTROLS 2 (1987). Gen-
eral licenses require no prior application and involve no license document. EAR, 15 C.F.R. § 371.1.
More sensitive exports and many reexports of U.S.-origin items require advance government ap-
proval in the form of a "validated license." See id. §§ 372.1-376.16. Validated licenses, id.
§ 372.2(a), include both Individual Validated Licenses (IVLs), which authorize single transactions,
id. § 372.2(b)(1), and the "multiple export" or bulk licenses that the 1985 EAAA authorizes, Pub. L.
No. 99-64, § 104(a), 99 Stat. 120, 122-23. The most commonly used bulk license is the "distribution
license," which covers multiple shipments to a pre-approved foreign consignee or distributor. See
EAR, 15 C.F.R. § 373.3.
For either type of validated license, a potential exporter must give Commerce's Office of Export
Licensing detailed information on the nature, value, recipient, and use of the proposed export. CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, U.S. CONGRESS, supra, at 2. Applications
for bulk licenses require especially detailed information. See EAR, 15 C.F.R. § 373. An exporter
can make no shipments until Commerce, consulting other government agencies as required, evalu-
ates and approves her application. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 78-79 &
fig. 4-2 (detailed flowchart of IVL review process, including DoD review chain (where authorized or
required)).
The section 10(g) issue that this Note examines concerns whether DoD's participation is, or
should be, required for proposed exports to "non-controlled" countries. See supra note 15. The
EAA's list of "controlled" countries comes from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620(f), 22
U.S.C. § 2370(f) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and includes Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Estonia, East
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Albania, Bulgaria, the PRC, Poland, Cuba,
Yugoslavia, Romania, Vietnam, Tibet, and the USSR. Id.; EAA §§ 16(b), 5(b)(1), 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2415(6), 2404(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985); EAR, 15 C.F.R. § 370.2. This Note does not discuss the
legality or wisdom of terminating DoD's role in all export licensing, although such a move has been
proposed. See infra note 174 (reporting discussions in unpublished hearings).
54. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 75; see also supra note 30 (defining
"economic containment").
55. 1979 EAA, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 10(g), 93 Stat. 503, 527-28 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 2409(g) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) (further amended 1988). The section provides:
(g) Special Procedures for Secretary of Defense
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the Secretary of Defense is
authorized to review any proposed export of any goods or technology to any country to
which exports are controlled for national security purposes and, whenever the Secretary of
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authorized DoD to review export license applications for "any country to
which exports are controlled for national security purposes. '56 In prac-
tice, DoD reviewed export licenses for Soviet bloc destinations only; this
practice reflected Commerce and DoD's shared belief that section 10(g)'s
language had the same meaning as the phrase "controlled country" used
elsewhere in the EAA.57
In mid-1981, however, as part of a broad crackdown in the adminis-
tration and enforcement of export controls,58 DoD began to claim that
section 10(g) authorized it to review applications for free-world export
licenses. In making this claim, it sought to check applications for risks of
diversion (i.e., unauthorized reexport).5 9 Commerce protested. The
agencies reached a compromise in September 1981, under a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (M.O.U.): Commerce began sending DoD cer-
tain high-technology, computer-related Individual Validated License
Defense determines that the export of such goods or technology will make a significant
contribution, which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States,
to the military potential of any such country, to recommend to the President that such
export be disapproved.
(2) .. .Whenever a license or other authority is requested for [an] export to any
country to which exports are controlled for national security purposes..., the Secretary [of
Commerce] shall notify the Secretary of Defense of such request, and the Secretary may
not issue any license or other authority pursuant to such request before the expiration of
the period within which the President may disapprove such export. The Secretary of De-
fense .... not later than 30 days after notification of the request, shall-
(A) recommend to the President that he disapprove any request for the export
of the goods or technology involved to the particular country... ;
(B) notify the Secretary [of Commerce] that he would recommend approval
subject to specified conditions; or
(C) recommend to the Secretary that the export of goods or technology be
approved.
If the President notifies the Secretary [of Commerce], within 30 days after receiving a
recommendation from the Secretary of Defense, that he disapproves such export, no license
or other authority may be issued for the export of such goods or technology to such
country.
i4)j Whenever the President exercises his authority under this subsection to modify or
overrule a recommendation made by the Secretary of Defense .... the President shall
promptly transmit to the Congress a statement indicating his decision, together with the
recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.
Id. (emphasis added). The text will refer to this provision as "section 10(g)."
56. Id. § 10(g)(1), (2), 93 Stat. at 527.
57. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text
(describing "controlled countries").
58. See, eg., Export Controls: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and
Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, on the Current Sys-
tem of U.S. and Multilateral National Security Export Controls and to Seek Strategies to Regulate
International Technology Transfer in Such a Manner as to Achieve a Desirable Balance Among the
National Objectives of Military Security, Economic Vitality, and Scientific and Technological Ad-
vance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Senate Hearings] (statement of Richard
Perle); Gonzalez, supra note 12, at 476-78 (describing Operation Exodus, the Customs Department's
controversial program of border searches for illegal shipments of high-technology exports).
59. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, EXPORT LICENSING: COMMERCE-
DEFENSE REVIEW OF APPLICATIONS TO CERTAIN FREE WORLD NATIONS 9 (1986).
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(IVL)6 0 applications for most free-world destinations. This arrangement
changed slightly in March 1984, when the President "affirmed" it6l and
also gave DoD "authority in principle" to review distribution licenses for
the same products and destinations.6 2
Under the M.O.U., 63 Commerce initially notifies DoD that it has
received an application in one of the agreed-upon categories and provides
an abstract of the application's contents. DoD has one week to request
that Commerce send it the license application (with supporting docu-
mentation). After Commerce sends the application, DoD must make a
recommendation within twenty-two days, or it loses the right to com-
ment on the application. The twenty-two-day "clock" stops, however, if
DoD requests further documentation from Commerce. If DoD recom-
mends license disapproval, it must tell Commerce its reasons "with speci-
ficity." Commerce simultaneously reviews applications sent to DoD. If
Commerce and DoD disagree, they must refer the application within ten
days to a Technology Transfer Steering Group (TTSG) that comprises
the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration (proba-
bly the Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration after
October 1, 1987), 64 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy, and the Deputy National Security Advisor. If dead-
locked itself, the TTSG can refer the matter to the President.65
Two government reports that influenced the 1983-1985 debates on
the EAA's reauthorization and amendment 66 explored DoD's expanding
role in export license review. A 1984 General Accounting Office (GAO)
report67 found Commerce's initial review to be a frequent source of need-
less delay and excess staffing 68 and recommended that DoD's review pre-
cede Commerce's in order to increase the focus on DoD's
recommendations. 69 The GAO regarded DoD's review as an indispensa-
ble part of the process. 70 An Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
60. See supra note 53 (defining IVL).
61. Announcement Concerning Licensing and Enforcement Procedures Under the Export Ad-
ministration Act, 1984 PUB. PAPERS 411 (Mar. 23, 1984) [hereinafter President's Announcement].
62. Id.
63. The procedure established under the M.O.U. continued under the 1985 presidential direc-
tive discussed below. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text; see also Liebman, West-West
Export Licensing, in THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1985 AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS 75, 77
(1985).
64. See infra note 168.
65. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 10.
66. See infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
67, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 10.
68. Id. at 15, 17.
69. Id. at vi-vii, 22.
70. The GAO thought DoD review vital because it considered DoD-and not Commerce-
best able to evaluate national security questions. Id. at 16, 22-23.
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study in 198371 took a different view in its discussion of the policy op-
tions facing the 98th Congress.72 Though the OTA mentioned making
DoD the primary licensing authority as one option, it noted that such a
move would serve national security ends only, and not the goals of export
licensing efficiency, foreign policy, or trade promotion. 73 In sum, the
OTA said, Congress faced a choice: to change export control policy radi-
cally, or to equivocate. 74
B. Developments During the Ninety-Eighth and Ninety-Ninth
Congresses.
The 1979 EAA's expiration in 198375 gave the 98th Congress an
opportunity to change the state of affairs under section 10(g), sparking a
battle over what change was desirable. In his EAA reauthorization bill
(S. 979), which the Senate passed in March 1984,76 Senator Jake Garn
(R-Utah) proposed amending EAA section 10(g) to make DoD's power
to review free-world export license applications explicit.77 The House's
already-passed reauthorization bill (H.R. 3231) contained no such
amendment, and throughout the 1984 conference committee discussions
the House maintained that "continued Commerce responsibility for deci-
sions on free-world license applications... is preferable to formal review
by other Departments over free-world licenses. ' 78 Fearing that licensing
71. OFFicE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 9.
72. Id. at 12-14.
73. Id. at 12 tbl. 1.
74. Id. at 98.
75. The 1979 EAA's authority ended on September 30, 1983, under 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419
(1982) (reauthorized and amended 1985). Between that date and the enactment of the 1985 EAAA,
Congress extended the statutory authority for export controls three times. See Act of Feb. 29, 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-222, 98 Stat. 36; Act of Dec. 5, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-207, 97 Stat. 1391; Act of Oct.
1, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-108, § 1, 97 Stat. 744. The President filled the gaps between Congress's
temporary reauthorizations with two Executive Orders, both of which he revoked when Congress
extended the EAA's expiration date. These Executive Orders were originally issued under the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1982). See Exec. Order No. 12,470, 3
C.F.R. 168 (1985), revoked, Exec. Order No. 12,525, 3 C.F.R. 377 (1986), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 note (Supp. III 1985); Exec. Order No. 12,444, 3 C.F.R. 214 (1984), revoked, Exec. Order
No. 12,451, 3 C.F.R. 223 (1984), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (Supp. III 1985).
76. S. 979, supra note 16, § 8(5)-(7), 130 CONG. REC. at S2255 (authorizing Secretary of De-
fense to review applications whenever Secretary "determines ... that [controlled] goods or technol-
ogy ... are likely to be diverted to proscribed destinations"). S. 979 actually passed on the day
before it appeared in the Congressional Record. See 130 CONG. REc. S2143 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984).
77. S. 979, supra note 16, § 8(5)-(7), 130 CONG. REC. at S2255; see also Overman, Reauthoriza-
tion of the Export Administration Act: Balancing Trade Policy with National Security, 17 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 325, 372 (1985) (discussing Sen. Garn's role in promoting change); cf. S. REP. No.
170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1983) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 98-170] (treating proposed change as
mere clarification of section 10(g)'s language).
78. H.R. REP. No. 257, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 9 (1983) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 98-
257]; see White, supra note 20, at 337-38.
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delays would harm U.S. exporters, the House decried the idea of giving
DoD a "veto" over free-world exports. 79 This disagreement, along with
disputes over a House provision banning bank loans to South Africa,80
prevented the 98th Congress from reauthorizing the EAA.
Within six months after first convening, the 99th Congress side-
stepped these controversies and enacted the 1985 EAAA. 81 Two actions
made enactment possible. First, the House decoupled its proposed South
Africa sanctions from the EAA reauthorization.8 2 Second, on January 4,
1985, the President issued a classified directive on DoD's license review
powers under section 10(g).8 3 The directive formalized the DoD review
taking place under the recently "affirmed" M.O.U. and authorized DoD
to review validated licenses for high-technology exports to fifteen free-
world destinations of its choice.84 The House and Senate seized the op-
portunity to dodge the section 10(g) issue: the successful EAA
reauthorization bill (S. 883) proposed no material changes to section
10(g). 85 The two-year debate over DoD's role in free-world license re-
view thus ended with a whimper.8 6
79. H.R. REP. No. 98-257, supra note 78, pt. 1, at 9. The administration, too, opposed the
Garn proposal, saying that it encroached on the Executive's power to control the agencies. See
Feldman, The Restructuring of National Security Controls under the 1985 Amendments to the Export
Administration Act: Multilateral Diplomacy and the Extraterritorial Application of United States
Law, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 235, 245 (1985). The administration also claimed that the existing section
10(g) language authorized DoD review of free-world export license applications. President's An-
nouncement, supra note 71, at 412.
80. H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 321, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 3231, supra note 17,
at 1519-20; see also White, supra note 20, at 339-40 (discussing the last-minute failure of a proposed
compromise).
81. Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (passed both Houses June 27, 1985; signed into law July 12,
1985). Working out problematic new sections in the reauthorization bills took most of the six
months. See Gonzalez, supra note 12, at 413-14 & nn.55-56.
82. 131 CONG. REC. H2004 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (statement of Rep. Bonker).
83. See, e.g., Classified Directive Sets Out Procedures on Pentagon Review of West-West
Licenses, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 90 (Jan. 16, 1985) (National Security Advisor Robert C. McFar-
lane signed "confidential" directive).
84. See id. at 90; supra note 61 and accompanying text. Under the directive, DoD reviews
license applications for exports to Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Lichten-
stein, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Syria. See Feldman,
supra note 79, at 245 n.57 (listing the fifteen countries).
85. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 62, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 108, 124 (statement of managers). S. 883's conference report attributed this silence
to the presidential directive:
In the end, the need for the amendment was removed by the decision of the President on
his own initiative .... As a result, the President's action obviates the need for the legisla-
tive change originally proposed by the Senate .... This matter may be raised again should
the need arise ....
Id., reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 124.
86. For a full description of the changes made by the 1985 EAAA, see generally Gonzalez,
supra note 12, at 427-502. The 1985 EAAA did include some changes in Commerce's and DoD's
respective export administration roles. First, in a move designed to "raise the priority and visibility"
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION A CT
III. THE 1985 EAAA's UNEASY COMPROMISE ON SECTION 10(G)
A. Congressional Post-Mortems.
Even as they were passing the 1985 EAAA, Congressmen and Sena-
tors struggled to explain their decision to leave section 10(g) unchanged
"as a result" of the President's January 1985 directive.8 7 Senator Garn,
who favored DoD free-world license review, was quick to stress two
sources of authority for such review: (1) the unchanged language of sec-
tion 10(g), which, he said, "preserved" DoD's authority to review export
licenses88 for "any country to which exports are controlled for national
security purposes,"8 9 and (2) the President's independent authority to
order such review, as exercised in his directive. 90 Senator John Heinz
(R-Pa.) highlighted Senator Garn's implicit legal conclusion:
I would simply say that the Senate was willing to drop its insistence on
the [section 10(g)] amendment since the President effectively pre-
empted the question with his decision of last January .... The state-
ment of managers [quoted above, 91] however, does make clear that the
President had the legal authority to take the action he took last Janu-
ary, unpopular though it may have been in some quarters. 92
Congressmen Don Bonker (D-Wash.) and Ed Zschau (D-Cal.),
long-time supporters of the interests of Commerce and the export com-
munity, took a different view of what the 1985 EAAA achieved. Con-
gressman Zschau opined:
On [the section 10(g)] issue, the House position prevailed and, as a
result, the [conference] bill . . .contains no amendment to section
10(g).
I would like to remind my colleagues that in the debate on the
House floor on April 16, 1985, . . . it was made clear that the House
of export control at Commerce, S. REP. No. 98-170, supra note 77, at 22, the 1985 EAAA replaced
Commerce's Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration with an Under Secretary for Export Ad-
ministration and two Assistant Secretaries. 1985 EAAA, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 116(a), 99 Stat. 120,
152 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2414(a) (Supp. III 1985)). The 1985 EAAA also created a "Na-
tional Security Control Office" within DoD, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 105(), 99 Stat. at 128 (codified at
50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(p) (Supp. III 1985)), that some Senators hoped would ensure "a broad and
direct policy role for the Defense Department... to counter balance [sic] that natural pro-trade bias
inherent at the Commerce Department," 131 CONG. REc. S8923 (daily ed. June 27, 1985) (statement
of Sen. Garn). That DoD office is now called the Defense Technology Security Administration
(DTSA). See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 13. Finally, the
1985 EAAA, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 1l(e), 99 Stat. at 143 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(f)(2)
(Supp. III 1985)), gave applicants the right to respond to negative recommendations on their license
requests.
87. See supra note 85.
88. 131 CONG. REc. S8922 (daily ed. June 27, 1985).
89. EAA § 10(g)(1), (2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
90. See 131 CONG. REc. at S8922.
91. See supra note 85.
92. 131 CONG. REc. at 58922.
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interprets section 10(g) of the Export Administration Act as amended
by [S. 883] as providing no authority to the Secretary of Defense for
reviewing proposed exports to countries other than controlled coun-
tries. In other words, the Department of Defense review of proposed
exports of goods and technology to countries other than controlled
countries would be illegal under the Export Administration Act of
1985.
9 3
Angered by DoD's continuing review of licenses for free-world exports
and the resulting delays suffered by exporters,94 Congressman Bonker
has even suggested that exporters sue the executive branch for its non-
compliance with the EAA. 95
The following two sections evaluate Congressmen Bonker and
Zschau's claim that the 1985 EAAA precludes DoD review of free-world
export licenses, as well as their implicit claim that continued execution of
the January 1985 presidential directive violates the Constitution.
93. Id. at H5061. In the April 16 debate that Rep. Zschau mentions, he asked Rep. Bonker
how the 1985 EAAA affected DoD's authority to review free-world license applications. Bonker
replied: "The law is explicit, and this legislation is explicit in that DoD has review authority only on
shipments to controlled countries. It does not possess statutory authority to review license ship-
ments to free world or COCOM countries, and no such authority is contained in this legislation."
Id. at H2012 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985); see also Implementation of the Export Administration Amend-
ments Act of 1985: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 98, 100 (1985) [hereinafter Fall 1985
Hearings] (Rep. Bonker reiterates this position in hearings held shortly after 1985 EAAA's enact-
ment); infra note 217 and accompanying text (Rep. Bonker reiterates this position during debate on
1988 OTCA).
94. See, e.g., April 1986 Hearings, supra note 27, at 64-66 (American Electronics Association
representative reports members' licensing experiences since 1985 EAAA), 201 (Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Trade Administration Paul Freedenberg estimates that DoD review adds average
of fourteen days to each affected application's processing time).
95. See, e.g., id. at 146 (statement of Rep. Bonker) ("[I]f the... executive branch[ ] is not
carrying out the law as Congress intended, then somebody ought to be able to bring it to court."); see
also Bonker Outlines Plans Following EAA Bill, Suggests Court Suit Over DoD Review Move, 2 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 952 (July 24, 1985) (discussing Rep. Bonker's proposal that someone sue execu-
tive branch). Congressman Bonker has not elaborated the theory that might underlie such a suit,
but he would probably claim both that continued DoD free-world license review violates section
10(g) as clarified by 1983-1985 legislative history, see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text, and
that the presidential directive is unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine, see infra
notes 121, 123-24, and accompanying text. Apparently, no exporters have followed Congressman
Bonker's suggestion. See April 1986 Hearing. supra note 27, at 146 (statement of Rep. Bonker)
("Unfortunately I can't find anybody in the private sector who is willing to take on the executive
branch . . . ."). The recent introduction of judicial review of civil sanctions, 1988 OTCA, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, § 2428(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1361-62 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(c)-(d)), may
make a meaningful court challenge possible.
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B. Statutory Authority for DoD Free-World License Review Under the
EAA as Amended Through 1985.
Congressman Bonker's argument against DoD's current role prem-
ises that section 10(g)'s phrase "country to which exports are controlled
for national security purposes" 96 has always meant the same thing as
"controlled country. '97 Bonker cites the lack of any material amend-
ment in 1985 as proof that DoD's review authority is still limited to con-
trolled-country exports.98 Senators Garn and Heinz, on the other hand,
believe that the 1979 EAA's section 10(g) 99 empowered DoD to review
export license requests for all destinations subject to any national secur-
ity controls. 100 In their view, the fact that the Senate proposed an
amendment to correct the House's errant reading of the section, but
dropped the amendment when the President solved the problem, detracts
nothing from the 1979 language's meaning.101 As shown below, the 1979
EAA's legislative history supports Congressman Bonker's position, but
subsequent events in Congress undermine it.102
DoD first received the power to review export license requests under
a 1974 amendment to the EAA. 0 3 As both the language1 4 and legisla-
96. EAA § 10(g)(1), (2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
97. See EAA § 16(6), 5(b)(1), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2415(6), 2404(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985); supra
note 53. If true, this means that DoD's free-world license review program lacks statutory authority.
Cf infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (original mandate for DoD license review extended to
"controlled countries" only). But cf infra note 120 (discussing another possible source of statutory
authority).
98. See H.R. Rap. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 101 (1987) [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 100-40] (The limitation of DoD review to controlled-country license requests "is confirmed in
prior legislative history, and reaffirmed by the failure of the conference committee on the Export
Administration Amendments Act of 1985 to expand the Defense Department's review authority.").
99. 1979 EAA, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 10(g), 93 Stat. 503, 527-28 (reprinted supra note 55).
100. This group of destinations includes all countries except Canada. See supra note 53.
101. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 106-19 and accompanying text.
103. Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-500, sec. 9, § 4(h), 88 Stat.
1552, 1555-56 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(h) (1976)) (superseded 1979).
104. Id.
(1) The Congress finds that the defense posture of the United States may be seriously
compromised if the Nation's goods and technology are exported to a controlled country
without an adequate and knowledgeable assessment being made to determine whether ex-
port of such goods and technology will significantly increase the military capability of such
country ....
(2) ... Whenever a license or other authority is requested for the export of such
goods or technology to any controlled country, the appropriate export control office or
agency to whom such request is made shall [forward the request to the Secretary of De-
fense for his recommendation].
(4) As used in this subsection-
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tive history of that amendment 10 5 make clear, the amendment authorized
DoD to review controlled-country export licenses only. In 1979, the 96th
Congress altered the 1974 language that confined DoD's review to con-
trolled-country exports. 10 6 Some passages in the legislative history ac-
commodate the view that this revision indicated a shift in congressional
intent.107 The committee report10 8 on the Senate bill that formed the
basis of the 1979 EAA, 10 9 however, stressed that the 96th Congress in-
tended to make no substantive change to the 1974 provision.110 Despite
the mystery surrounding Congress's rationale for overhauling section
10(g), the relevant House Report "1I and the floor debates 1 2 confirm that
the 1979 EAA continued to limit DoD's review authority to controlled-
country exports.
(C) the term "controlled country" means any Communist country as defined
under section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Id.
105. S. REP. No. 1024, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 6241.
Section 9 [of the bill that became Pub. L. No. 93-500] would add a new subsection 4(h)(1)
[to] the Act to establish review procedures for exports of goods and technology to "con-
trolled countries" (defined to mean Communist countries as specified in section 620(f) of
the Foreign Assistance ActD] .... The purpose is to insure that the Department of De-
fense has an adequate opportunity to consider the military and national security implica-
tions of exports to Communist Countries ....
Id., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6241.
106. Compare supra note 104 (1974 version) with supra note 55 (1979 version).
107. See S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 10, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1147, 1157 (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs report on
1979 EAA's legislative history, describing Senate's EAA reauthorization bill, S. 737, § 4(h), as pro-
viding for "review by the Secretary of Defense of export licenses required for national security pur-
poses"). Note that the phrase "export licenses" in the Senate Report is not preceded by "all". See
also H.R. REP. No. 200, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1979) (House's counterpart provision, H.R. 4034,
sec. 104(c), § 10(i), "[as was] the case in present law, . .. specifically authorized [DoD] to appeal to
the President any export license decisions which the Department of Defense considers inconsistent
with U.S. national security" (emphasis added)). If the House Report's drafters intended "any export
license decisions" to extend beyond decisions on controlled-country export licenses, they erred in
describing the House bill as consistent with pre-1979 law. See supra note 105.
108. S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter S. REP. No. 96-169], reprinted in 1979
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1147.
109. See H.R. CONP. REP. No. 482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 50, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1180, 1187 (reporting adoption of key Senate provisions); 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1147 (editors' sketch of 1979 EAA's legislative history).
110. S. REP. No. 96-169, supra note 108, at 10, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 1157.
111. See H.R. REP. No. 200, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1979) ("H.R. 4034 preserves and strength-
ens the current sharing of responsibility among the Departments of Commerce, Defense and State
.... "), 21 (emphasizing that "section 10 does not alter the role of any agency in the licensing
process").
112. See 125 CONG. REC. 20,110 (1979) (statement of Rep. Bingham that DoD "has a veto over
exports to Communist countries"); id. at 20,111-12 (quoting letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense
Duncan to Sen. Stevenson that stated DoD's satisfaction with its pre-1979 review authority); id. at
19,959 (statement of Sen. Stevenson, quoting same letter).
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION A CT
This state of affairs prevailed until the 1983-1985 reauthorization
battle, which obscured the congressional intent regarding section 10(g).
That the Senate's policy choice prevailed in 1985 by virtue of the Presi-
dent's directive 13 weakens Congressman Bonker's argument that the
EAA means today what it meant in 1974 and 1979. Bonker must also
explain why "controlled country" 114 and "country to which exports are
controlled for national security purposes"I I5-phrases juxtaposed in one
Export Administration Act-should mean the same thing.116 Senators
Garn and Heinz, in contrast, must respond to the argument that if
"country to which exports are controlled for national security purposes"
already had a congressionally ordained meaning different from that of
"controlled country," the Senate in 1984 would not have pressed for a
change that appeared more like a substantive amendment than a mere
"clarification."1 17
Neither side's legislative history argument gains much from the fact
that executive action finally persuaded the 99th Congress to leave section
10(g) alone.118 Pressured to reauthoize the EAA and seeing no prospect
of agreement on a change to section 10(g), Congress used the 1985 direc-
tive as a welcome invitation to drop the subject. Statements in the Con-
gressional Record reflect no consensus on the existing statutory basis for
DoD free-world license review, 119 or on the wisdom of broadening
DoD's review authority. The statutory authority for DoD free-world li-
cense review thus remains uncertain.' 20
113. See Harris & Bialos, Congressional Balancing Act Benefits Exporters, Legal Times, Aug. 5,
1985, at 17, col. 1, 20, col. 1.
114. EAA §§ 16(6), 5(b)(1), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2415(6), 2404(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985); see supra
note 53.
115. Id. § 10(g)(1), (2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(1 ), (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
116. See 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 46.05 (each element of statute
should be construed in connection with other elements, to produce a harmonious whole), 46.06 (a
statute should be construed such that no part will be void or insignificant) (C. Sands 4th ed. 1984).
In the 1985 EAAA, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 106(a)(1)(D), 99 Stat. 120, 128, the 99th Congress showed
that it knew how to narrow an EAA section's meaning by amendment. Congress constricted the
"foreign availability" exclusion from the militarily critical technologies list, see EAA § 5(d), 50
U.S.C. app. § 2404(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), from "possessed by countries to which exports are
controlled under this section," id. § 5(d)(2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(2) (1982) (emphasis added), to
"possessed by, or available in fact from sources outside the United States to, controlled countries,"
id., 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(2) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
117. See S. REP. No. 98-170, supra note 77, at 17.
118. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
120. But cf Hentzen, United States Export Restrictions for Foreign Policy and National Security
Purposes." The 1985 Amendments to the Export Administration Act and Beyond, 26 CoLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 122 (1987).
The legality of the President's action would have been highly doubtful under the 1979 Act,
which granted the Defense Department only a very limited role in the export control pro-
cess. The action, however, was justified by the President's sweeping [IEEPA] powers in a
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C. Constitutionality of the Presidential Directive.
The President's January 1985 directive broke a two-year congres-
sional deadlock and formalized DoD's practice of free-world license re-
view. In view of the 1985 EAAA's ambiguity, however, the directive
may not provide sufficient authority for DoD's current role. Congress-
man Bonker thinks that the directive is clearly insufficient authority for
such a role.121 His claim that DoD's free-world license review program
is illegal raises the issue whether the President has authority to control
exports when Congress is indifferent or opposed.
If pressed, the Attorney General most likely would defend the direc-
tive as an exercise of the President's independent power as "the sole or-
gan of the federal government in the field of international relations."' 122
Opponents of the directive would stress Congress's power to regulate for-
eign commerce. 123 They would contend that the subordinate character
of the President's foreign affairs power' 24 prevents him from ordering a
controversial change in export administration without congressional
approval.
In determining the validity of independent presidential action, the
Supreme Court has found Justice Jackson's 1952 concurrence in Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (the Steel Seizure Case) 25 "analytically
useful."'126 Assessing the constitutionality of President Truman's effort
national state of emergency, which President Reagan had declared in order to extend con-
trols under the EAA when it lapsed in 1983.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
If the IEEPA ever supported DoD free-world license review, it does not now. The order that
terminated the President's last EAA extension, Exec. Order No. 12,525, 3 C.F.R. 377 (1986), re-
printed in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (Supp. III 1985); see supra note 75, purports to preserve the effec-
tiveness of all administrative actions taken during the extension. Even if the January 1985 directive
is considered an administrative action, however, it lacks statutory support from the IEEPA: as Mr.
Hentzen notes, any state of emergency that supported an IEEPA-based extension ended when Con-
gress enacted the 1985 EAAA. Hentzen, supra, at 116; see also id. at 126-27 n.161 (noting definition
of "unusual or extraordinary threat" under IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1982), and how the Presi-
dent has stretched it to suit his purposes). For a full treatment of IEEPA issues, see Harris & Bialos,
The Strange New World of United States Export Controls Under the International Emergency Eco-
nomic PowersAct, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 71 (1985).
121. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
122. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). Its discussion of
the Executive's foreign affairs power aside, Curtiss-Wright supports congressional delegations to the
Executive in the international relations area. See, eg., United States v. Brumage, 377 F. Supp. 144,
149-50, 150 n.l 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (presuming part of 1969 EAA valid in view of Curtiss-Wright).
123. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
124. See Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (The President's independent power "does not require
as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but .... of course, like every other governmental power,
must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.").
125. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) [hereinafter Steel Seizure Case] (Jackson, J., concurring).
126. E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (in case involving President's
suspension of claims against Iran, assertedly justified under IEEPA, Court endorses Justice Jack-
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to impound steel mills during a nationwide strike, the Steel Seizure Case
majority noted that "[t]he President's power, if any, ... must stem either
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."1 27 In a concur-
ring opinion intended to draw the borders between executive and legisla-
tive power, 128 Justice Jackson proposed to judge presidential assertions of
residual power by "their disjunction or conjunction with [the will] of
Congress." 129 He split the conceivable situations into three groups:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum.... [and is]
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation ....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independ-
ent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
may have concurrent authority .... Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical mat-
ter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential respon-
sibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb .... 130
Although each side would claim that section 10(g)'s wording reflects
an "express or implied" congressional endorsement of its position,' 3 '
most courts132 and commentators would note Congress's "inertia," or its
"quiescence," on the section 10(g) issue. 133 The courts therefore would
analyze the 1985 presidential directive under Justice Jackson's second
category: the directive's validity would depend "on a consideration of all
the circumstances which might shed light on the views of the Legislative
Branch toward such action," 134 including Congress's withdrawal from
the section 10(g) issue in 1985.
son's analysis, but notes his warning that "his three categories represent 'a somewhat over-simplified
grouping,' 343 U.S. at 635 ...
127. 343 U.S. at 585.
128. Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 635.
130. Id. at 635-37 (citations omitted); see also Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668-69 (describing
Justice Jackson's three-category approach as "a spectrum running from explicit congressional au-
thorization to explicit congressional prohibition").
131. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 95 (discussing a possible role for courts in reviewing this issue).
133. Supra text accompanying note 130; see supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
134. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668 (citing Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
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Although the 98th and 99th Congresses failed to amend section
10(g) as the Senate wanted, a Steel Seizure Case review of legislative his-
tory from 1974 to 1985 would probably shore up the presidential direc-
tive.1 35 Were it not for the President's action, the Senate and House
might still be deadlocked over a bill like Senator Garn's in the 98th Con-
gress.' 3 6 Both the House conference report on the 1985 EAAA 137 and
statements on the Senate floor 138 credit the directive with ending the de-
bate over section 10(g). Furthermore, despite Congressmen Bonker and
Zschau's belief in the directive's illegality,1 39 the House passed the 1985
EAAA,140 which at least indirectly legitimated President Reagan's order.
That order is the clearest edsting authority for DoD's controversial free-
world license review program.
IV. POLICY ANALYSES OF DoD FREE-WORLD EXPORT LICENSE
REVIEW SINCE 1985
Partly because of its questionable legal pedigree,' 4 ' DoD's free-
world export license review program has attracted sharp criticism since
1985. Furthermore, several authorities have cited long delays in licens-
ing, lost sales, and recent export control lapses as symptoms of a more
general problem with interagency license review under the EAA. Some
of these broader critiques place blame on DoD.' 42 This section will re-
view evidence suggesting that DoD's current role in the export licensing
regime is a failure-evidence that spurred the 100th Congress to consider
amending EAA section 10(g).143
A. The GAO Study on Interagency Review.
In September 1986, the GAO published a detailed study of DoD's
135. Not all standards for determining residual presidential power support President Reagan's
injection of DoD into the West-West export licensing process. For example, Justice Jackson pro-
posed to test presidential initiatives against "the imperatives of events and contemporary imponder-
ables," Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 637-i.e., with public policy analysis. See Comment, The
Intent, Effectiveness, and Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto of Export Controls, 1983 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 59, 98. DoD's free-world export licensing role arguably reflects an imbalance between the pol-
icy objectives of national security and trade promotion. See infra notes 144-63, 169-79, and accom-
panying text; see also EAA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (setting forth statute's
policy goals). This imbalance might influence a court's constitutional analysis under the Steel
Seizure Case
136. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 85.
138. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
140. Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120.
141. See supra notes 96-139 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 159-63, 169-70, and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 182-98 and accompanying text.
Vol. 1988:785] EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT 805
involvement in the free-world export licensing process.144 The study re-
vealed that, over the twelve-day period studied, Commerce disagreed
with, and ultimately overrode, approximately two-thirds of DoD's li-
cense denial recommendations, 145 apparently claiming that the DoD rec-
ommendations lacked specificity.146 In other cases, Commerce and DoD
resolved their differences by making licenses "conditional" on reductions
in the size or technical sophistication of the shipments. Even these con-
ditional licenses were often slow in coming. 147 Other applications re-
ceived a "returned without action" status-a kind of "soft rejection."' 148
The GAO report faulted both agencies for not sharing informa-
tion. 149 It implied that Commerce, which looks for specific problems
with a shipment before disapproving it,15o presumes approval, whereas
DoD, which recommends against all shipments having certain general
characteristics, 15' presumes disapproval. 52 The GAO concluded that ef-
forts to improve the agencies' cooperation "should lead to greater consis-
tency between Defense's licensing recommendations and Commerce's
licensing actions. [This consistency] will raise the question of whether
Defense review of individual free world, license applications should be
continued in its present form.' 53
B. The NAS Panel's View.
In January 1987, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) issued
an analysis and critique of national security export controls under the
EAA.154 The NAS panel 5 5 found that current law provides sufficient
144. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 59.
145. Id. at 2, 3.
146. Id. at 4. DoD relies heavily on end-user information purchased from Dun & Bradstreet
and data gathered from other government agencies. Id. at 13-14. The GAO also reported that the
Technology Transfer Steering Group (TTSG), which the directive intended to settle all intended
licensing disputes between DoD and Commerce, see supra text accompanying notes 64-65, was mori-
bund at the time of the study. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 59,
at 10. In his formal response to the study, DoD Under Secretary for Trade Security Policy Stephen
Bryen protested Commerce's overrides of DoD. Id. at 42.
147. The study showed that the conditional licenses often took from six to ten weeks to process.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 28-31.
148. See id. at 15 tbl. 2.1.
149. Id. at 13, 18, 33.
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id. One such characteristic would be an end user who deals regularly with the PRC. See
id. at 18.
152. See, e.g., id. at 21-23 (describing agencies' dispute whether resale is an objectionable end
use).
153. Id. at 24.
154. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5.
155. The NAS report was written by a special panel of experts from the government, the mili-
tary, and industry, id. at iii-iv, who were "charged to examine the current system of U.S. and multi-
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authority for a wholly "balanced" system, but that "the executive branch
has failed to implement the existing provisions of law in a coherent and
effective manner." 156 Its report proposed a host of corrective meas-
ures,157 some of which influenced the 100th Congress.1 58
The NAS report criticized DoD's general approach to export con-
trols, and specifically attacked DoD's role in export license review.1 59
Because of "[tlhe exclusive DoD focus on tightening export controls
without balanced input from other agencies concerning the possible eco-
nomic and long-term national security consequences," it stated, "con-
flicts have arisen among the responsible agencies... industry has been
confused and alarmed..., and allies have become annoyed ... ." ,60 The
report noted that five percent of all applications take 100 days or more to
process, causing huge losses to U.S. exporters.1 61 The NAS suggested
two reforms that bear on the section 10(g) problem: (1) firm policy gui-
dance and mediation by the National Security Council,162 and (2) a re-
duction in DoD's role in detailed license review, coupled with an increase
in Commerce's responsibilities. 163
lateral national security export controls and to seek strategies... to achieve a desirable balance
among the national objectives of military security, economic vitality, and scientific and technological
advance." Id. at 1.
156. Id. at 177. The panel estimated the annual direct costs of national security export controls
at $9 billion, which translates into a GNP reduction of approximately $17 billion. Id. at 121.
157. See id. at 167-77 (recommendations of panel).
158. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note
53, at 5. In particular, the House's omnibus trade bill accepted the NAS panel's recommendation
that Congress reduce DoD's role in detailed license review, see infra notes 163, 188-92, and accom-
panying text, although the recommendation did not survive in the 1988 OTCA, see infra note 201
and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 131, 175 (noting an "imbal-
ance in the policy process" stemming from dominance of DoD's trade security policy organization).
160. Id. at 161.
161. Id. at 112-14.
162. Id. at 173-74. The panel stressed the need for the secretaries of all affected agencies, not
just DoD, to attend NSC meetings involving export control matters. It also recommended that a
senior NSC staff member be given responsibility for bringing together representatives of conflicting
agencies to resolve their policy differences. Id. at 175.
163. Id. In this connection, the panel suggested that DoD's proper role should be limited to
helping Commerce identify strategic technologies, and that DoD's "policy side" has arrogated Com-
merce's powers. See id
For a cogent criticism of the NAS study, see Fedorowycz, Preventing the Transfer of Militarily
Critical Technology to the Soviet Bloc: The Case for Strong National Security Export Controls, 26
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 53, 81-86 (1987). Citing a number of DoD sources, Mr. Fedorowycz
attacks the NAS's "decidedly pro-export approach," id. at 81, along these lines:
While the panel's points regarding U.S. economic interests may be true, they obscure
the more significant implications of the fact that at least the Soviets view the acquisition of
Western technology as critical to their military capabilities. The Soviet technology collec-
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C. Export Control Failures Reported in the Press.
In September 1987, DoD's and Commerce's "intense competition
for hegemony over the export-control process" came into public view
when the press reported a battle over a computer shipment to Trans-
nautic, a partly Soviet-owned company in West Germany. 164 The dis-
pute, while not directly related to EAA section 10(g), 165 exemplifies the
possible consequences of uncertain export control laws. Because of mis-
communication and silence between Commerce and DoD, an American
manufacturer had difficulty getting an export license and lost its cus-
tomer to a U.S. exporter of similar, Japanese-made hardware. That ex-
porter's license request had sailed through Commerce without DoD
review.166
tion effort can only be facilitated by a pro-exporting environment of "global competitive-
ness" in the West ....
Id. at 85 (footnote omitted). He concludes that any export control reform should preserve or in-
crease DoD's role. Id. at 100. Yet, as even Mr. Fedorowycz agrees, export controls that "penalize
U.S. commercial interests while contributing little or nothing to Western security should be abol-
ished," id. at 85; Mr. Fedorowycz presents little evidence to rebut the NAS's conclusion, see NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENcEs, supra note 5, at 112-14, that the current DoD free-world license
review program falls into that category.
164. Pentagon Faults Commerce for Licensing Shipments to Communist-Backed Finns, Wall St.
J., Sept. 30, 1987, at 24, cols. 1, 2. Transnautic monitors cargo passing through German ports. The
Soviet state entity Sovfracht owns 51 percent of Transnautic's stock. U.S. Split Over Computer Sale
to a Soviet-Owned Company, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 1, D6, col. 2. Transnautic had
legally bought IBM computers for years. Id. at D6, col. 2.
165. Under regulations released in January 1986, Commerce treats computer-related exports to
Soviet-bloc-controlied firms in Western countries like shipments to the Soviet bloc countries them-
selves. EAR, 15 C.F.R. § 376.10 (1988); see Department of Commerce, Office of Export Admin.,
Fact Sheet: Forty-nine Approved Export License Cases Discussed by DoD 1 (Oct. 2, 1987) (avail-
able from Department of Commerce Public Information Office); cf 1988 OTCA, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, § 2413, 102 Stat. 1107, 1347 (amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985)) (codifying
this practice). At its discretion, Commerce consults DoD on such applications. See Pentagon Faults
Commerce for Licensing Shipments to Communist-Backed Firms, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1987, at 24,
cols. 1-2.
166. In September 1986, IBM's West German subsidiary proposed to sell a mainframe contain-
ing five-year-old technology to Transnautic and applied for a U.S. export license. N.Y. Times, Sept.
29, 1987, at D6, col. 2. Commerce forwarded IBM's application to DoD, which recommended
disapproval. See id. at D6, col. 4. When, in February 1987, Commerce warned IBM of likely disap-
proval, IBM protested, but DoD refused to change its position. IBM and the West German govern-
ment explained to Commerce, however, that extraterritorial application of U.S. export controls
would amount to the U.S. deciding that one German company could not sell a computer to another
German company. The explanation, in addition to IBM's agreement to perform special monitoring
to prevent diversion, prompted Commerce to grant a license on June 10, 1987-without notifying
DoD. See id. at D6, cols. 4-5.
As it turned out, the licensing delay had cost IBM the sale. Transnautic had already ordered an
equivalent, Japanese-made computer from a U.S. subsidiary of the National Semiconductor Corpo-
ration. Id. at D6, cols. 5-6. Because of an error, Commerce had not identified National's export
license application (required because the computer contained U.S. parts) as targeted for a Soviet-
bloc-owned entity, and had approved it without DoD review. Id at D6, col. 6.
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When the Transnautic blunder came to light, DoD publicly at-
tacked Commerce, accusing it of hiding the successful license request.1 67
These charges demonstrate DoD's fierce determination to review, and
perhaps to disapprove, as many arguably "divertible" shipments as possi-
ble-an attitude characteristic of its free-world license review under
EAA section 10(g).168
D. Hearings in the Ninety-Ninth and One Hundredth Congresses.
Congress began to hear complaints about DoD free-world license
review soon after it enacted the 1985 EAAA. In October 1985, a House
subcommittee learned that DoD had convinced Commerce to disapprove
167. DoD Under Secretary Stephen Bryen accused Commerce of hiding National Semiconduc-
tor's application, id., even though had National Semiconductor filed an identical application three
days later, Commerce would have issued a general license under a change in the EAR. See 15
C.F.R. § 376.12 (establishing "de minimis" exception to export licensing requirements for foreign
goods containing 10% U.S. parts or less, subject to $10,000 maximum value per shipment). In a
press briefing, DoD spokesman Fred Hoffman called Commerce's handling of the whole Transnautic
case
a lapse in responsibility in the control of technology vital to the national security...
[which] can only lead to a lessening of our technological lead over the Eastern Bloc and ...
also serve[s] to discredit all the U.S. Government's efforts and those of our allies to revital-
ize the technical transfer control mechanism in the wake of the Toshiba/Kongsberg epi-
sode.
F. Hoffman, Transcript of News Briefing 3 (Sept. 29, 1987) (available from DoD Public Information
Office).
The Toshiba/Kongsberg episode involved an illegal sale to the Soviets of numerically controlled
(NC) milling machines by Japan's Toshiba Machine Company, and an associated sale of software by
the Norwegian government-owned arms manufacturer Kongsberg Trading Company. The milling
technology has enabled the Soviets to make significant gains in antisubmarine warfare. See Toshiba
Details Trail of Crime in Sale of Machinery to Soviet, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
Toshiba and Kongsberg have responded that they were only two of a multitude of illegal competitors
for Soviet business. See Norway Finds Allies Violated Cocom Controls, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1987, at
34, col. 1 (identifying other illegal competitors).
Although Toshiba Machine's and Kongsberg's illegal sales violate only CoCom, and not U.S.,
controls, the 1988 OTCA levies severe import sanctions against the violators. See Pub. L. No. 100-
418, § 2443, 102 Stat. at 1365-66 (imposing three-year general import ban against Toshiba Machine
and Kongsberg Trading, plus three-year U.S. government procurement ban against violators' parent
companies, Toshiba Corporation and Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk; both bans subject to limited excep-
tions); see also infra note 199 and accompanying text (reporting how debate over Toshiba/Kong-
sberg sanctions slowed trade bill's progress).
168. The press did not widely report one other recent development that affects the DoD/Com-
merce relationship in export licensing: a one-year delay in the appointment of an Under Secretary of
Commerce for Export Administration, required to occur on October 1, 1986 under the 1985 EAAA,
Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 116(d), 99 Stat. at 153. Late Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige clearly
opposed this change, see 1987 Senate Hearings supra note 58, at 17-18, and managed to secure a
one-year extension through an appropriations rider, see Defense Production Act Amendments of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-441, § 5, 100 Stat. 1117, 1118. Paul Freedenberg became the Acting Under
Secretary on October 1, 1987. See Bus. AM., Oct. 12, 1987, at inside front cover (reporting transfer
of responsibilities to Under Secretary and staf); id., Oct. 26, 1987, at inside front cover (quoting
Freedenberg as Acting Under Secretary for Export Administration).
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an application in only one case and that DoD was responding by impos-
ing onerous approval conditions. 169 Moreover, a Commerce official re-
ported, DoD review adds an average of twenty days to free-world license
processing times.170 Nonetheless, a trade bill that proposed detailed
study of DoD's free-world license review program 71 died in committee
at the end of the 99th Congress.1 72
The House introduced a new trade bill in the first days of the 100th
Congress, 173 and in March 1987, subcommittees of both chambers began
hearings on export controls. 174 They heard a flood of testimony urging a
cutback in DoD free-world license review. 175 They also heard an articu-
late defense of DoD's role from Richard Perle, then Assistant Secretary
169. Fall 1985 Hearings, supra note 93, at 55-56 (statement of Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Trade Administration William Archey); see also supra note 147 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing "conditional" license process).
170. Fall 1985 Hearings, supra note 93, at 5 (statement of Assistant Secretary Archey); see also
Note, Failures in the Interagency Administration of National Security Export Controls, 19 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 537, 567-68 (1987) (discussing DoD's tactics for delaying licenses and evading its
deadlines for making recommendations: requesting additional information from Commerce and
then studying cases further at leisurely pace). It remains to be seen whether the shorter DoD review
period that the 1988 OTCA mandates, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2425(a)(3), 102 Stat. at 1360 (amend-
ing 50 U.S.C. § 2409(g)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), will improve this situation.
171. H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 325, 132 CONG. REc. H3053 (daily ed. May 21, 1986)
(requiring GAO report within six months).
172. See [1985-1986] 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 35,087 (status of bill as of 99th Congress's end:
Senate Finance Committee had begun "markup"). The bill died because it was too complex and
controversial to pass in the last six months of an election year.
173. H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H2642-747 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987) [here-
inafter H.R. 3], introduced, 133 CONG. REc. H101 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987).
174. See 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 58 (March 12 and 17, 1987). The International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee held its hearings on
March 11 and 12, 1987, but has not yet released transcripts. Unofficial transcripts, on file in the
Subcommittee's office, contain testimony and questions on the wisdom of eliminating DoD review of
all licenses, including licenses for controlled-country exports. Congressman AuCoin's (D-Or.) bill,
H.R. 1141, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1987), introduced, 133 CONG. REc. H7333 (daily ed. Feb. 19,
1987), contained just such a provision-a section eliminating EAA section 10(g).
175. See Fedorowycz, supra note 163, at 80 (summarizing this testimony, which was consistent
with the reports discussed supra notes 144-63 and accompanying text). Congressman Bonker, re-
counting the testimony before his subcommittee, attacked DoD free-world license review:
Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade has re-
vealed only one instance in more than two years and 30,000 license applications that the
Defense Department has provided any information which was otherwise unavailable to the
Department of Commerce....
The committee did find, however, that such review lengthened the amount of time
required to process license applications.... Furthermore, the Defense Department has
persisted in imposing conditions on license applications beyond the scope of their review
mandate .... requiring time-consuming negotiations which have added to the overall case-
processing times.
H.IL REP. No. 100-40, supra note 98, pt. 3, at 100-02; see also S. REP. No. 85, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
77 (1987) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 100-85] (statements of Sens. Cranston and Dodd) ("The chorus of
anecdotes we have heard tells a story of lost sales, withdrawn licenses, and an absence of confidence
in our present system of controls.").
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of Defense for International Security Policy. Mr. Perle defended DoD's
single-mindedness in export control, saying that "the trade benefits [of
liberal controls] are minuscule in relation to the investment in defense
that they force upon us." ' 176 He saw DoD as a source of independence
from foreign and business pressures on the licensing process, and hinted
that those pressures were prompting the House to silence DoD's pro-
national-security view. 177 In response to a written question from Senator
Garn, he criticized the NAS study as "long on proposals for change but
short on hard cost/benefit analysis." 178 He stressed the importance of
licensing conditions and an "audit trail" for free-world exports, and de-
cried "roller coaster legislation" that would change the status quo under
the presidential directive. 179
The evidence convinced Congress of the need for change, and in
mid-1987 each chamber passed a trade bill proposing an amendment to
EAA section 10(g). 180 Congress acted despite lurking doubts about the
wisdom of reviving the policy debate. 181
V. INDECISION IN THE ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
A. The Omnibus Trade Bill Provisions.
The 100th Congress's omnibus trade bill conference faced the task
of reconciling a Senate provision that proposed few changes to EAA sec-
tion 10(g) 182 with a House provision that advocated "reaffirming the pri-
macy of the Department of Commerce in export control matters"183
through a reduction of DoD's license review authority under the section.
The bills reflected the House and Senate's agreement that EAA subsec-
176. 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 74. On March 11, 1987, Assistant Secretary Perle
gave like testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade. See supra note 174.
177. 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 86.
178. Id. at 177 (written response).
179. Id. at 183-84, 84.
180. S. 1420, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1021 (1987) [hereinafter Senate Amendement] (copy on
file in offices of Duke Law Journal); H.R. 3, supra note 173, § 332(n), 133 CONG. REc. at H2685.
The Senate Amendment passed, with amendments, on July 21, 1987, as the Senate amendment to
H.R. 3. See 133 CONG. Rc. S10,372 (daily ed. July 21, 1987). The House bill passed, with amend-
ments, on April 30, 1987. See 133 CONG. REc. H2981 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1987).
181. See 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 25, 66 (statements of Sens. Heinz and Garn).
But see id. at 46 (General Lew Allen, chairman of NAS panel, clarning that current EAA provides
adequate authority, but congressional initiative may guide administrative reform).
182. See Senate Amendment, supra note 180, § 1021. For a list of participants in the export
controls subconference and a comparison of the two chambers' proposed EAA amendments, see
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., H.R. 3, OMNIBUS
TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS LEGISLATION: COMPARISON OF HOUSE AND SENATE PROVISIONS
236-62 (Comm. Print 1987).
183. H.R. REP. No. 100-40, supra note 98, pt. 3, at 67.
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tion 10(g)(4), 184 which required the President to defend himself before
Congress whenever he picked DoD's recommendation over Commerce's,
should be deleted.185 That agreement nearly ended the bills' similarities.
Section 332(n) of the House bill (H.R. 3) proposed replacing the
troublesome phrase "country to which exports are controlled for national
security purposes" with the defined phrase "controlled country" 186
throughout section 10(g). 187 The bill went on to limit DoD's review
powers to those expressly stated in the EAA.188 These two changes
would have revoked any existing statutory authority for DoD's free-
world license review program 89 and would have removed any congres-
sional imprimatur from the January 1985 presidential directive.190 In
addition, the House bill stiffened DoD's twenty-day deadline for han-
dling licenses still within its review authority. 191 Subsection 332(n)(2)(b)
of the bill proposed eliminating one other source of discord and licensing
delays: DoD's power to demand licensing conditions under EAA sub-
section 10(g)(2)(B). 192
Section 1021 of the Senate amendment, in contrast, recommended
leaving section 10(g)'s language intact, 193 disregarding the NAS panel's
and the GAO's recommendations. 94 The section also preserved DoD's
184. See EAA § 10(g)(4),50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(4) (1982) (repealed 1988).
185. See Senate Amendment, supra note 180, § 1021(2); H.R. 3, supra note 173, § 332(n)(3), 133
CONG. REc. at H2685; see also S. REP. No. 100-85, supra note 175, at 16 (proposing to delete the
requirement because it "was too intrusive on a Presidential prerogative, gave excessive influence to
DOD, and had the effect of delaying timely decisions"). The 1988 OTCA, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 2425(a)(4), 102 Stat. 1107, 1360, reflects the House and Senate's agreement on this point. See also
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 824 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-
576] (explaining deletion of EAA § 10(g)(4), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(4) (1982)), reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1547, 1857; 1988 OTCA, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2, 102 Stat. at
1119 (designating H.R. CONF. REp. No. 100-576, supra, as legislative history of 1988 OTCA, with
exceptions not relevant to this Note).
186. EAA §§ 5(b)(1), 16(6), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404(b)(1), 2415(6) (Supp. III 1985).
187. See H.R. 3, supra note 173, § 332(n)(1), (2)(A), 133 CONG. REc. at H2685 (proposing to
amend EAA § 10(g)(1), (2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
188. Id. § 332(n)(3), 133 CONG. Rac. at H2685 (proposing replacement of EAA § 10(g)(4), 50
U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(4) (1982), with provision limiting DoD review powers to those "provided in
this subsection").
189. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REp. No. 100-40, supra note
98, pt. 3, at 101 (presenting House's rationale for cutting back DoD's role).
190. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text; cf supra note 120 (discussing theory that
IEEPA provides statutory authority for DoD free-world license review).
191. See H.R. 3, supra note 173, § 332(n)(2)(D), 133 CONG. REC. at H2685; see also EAA
§ 10(g)(2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (establishing twenty-day deadline
that House bill fortified).
192. EAA § 10(g)(2)(B), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(2)(B) (1982); see supra notes 147, 169, and
accompanying text.
193. See Senate Amendment, supra note 180, § 1021.
194. See supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text.
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power to impose conditions on export license approvals. 195 Like H.R. 3,
however, the Senate amendment limited DoD's license review time to
twenty days, 196 and it exhorted DoD to "carefully consider" each appli-
cation that it reviews.197 Finally, section 1021 contained a provision to
ensure that the President has both agencies' recommendations when he
resolves a licensing dispute under EAA section 10(g)(2). 198
B. Agreement on the 1988 OTCA.
The House and Senate's disagreement over DoD free-world license
review contributed to the slow progress of the conference committee's
export controls subconference, but a heated debate over retroactive sanc-
tions against Toshiba Corporation and Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk soon
stole section 10(g)'s limelight. 199 Six months after its formation, the sub-
conference finally arrived at a compromise on Toshiba/Kongsberg sanc-
tions, 'raising hopes that the unwieldy task of resolving the differences
between the two omnibus bills was nearing completion. 2°° At about the
same time, the House conferees abandoned their position on section
10(g)'s crucial phrase, in exchange for Senate acceptance of a provision
requiring the mandatory elimination of unilateral export controls.20 1
The conference's agreement nearly came to naught in the spring of
1988. President Reagan vetoed the trade bill, focusing on the bill's con-
troversial requirement that management warn workers sixty days before
plant closings or long-term layoffs; 20 2 shortly thereafter, an override at-
195. Senate Amendment, supra note 180, § 1021.
196. Id. § 1021(1).
197. Id.
198. Id.; see EAA § 10(g)(2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also 1988
OTCA, Pub. L. No. 100418, § 2425(a)(2), 102 Stat. 1107, 1360 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2409(g)(2)) (incorporating section 1021 of the Senate Amendment).
199. See Cranford, Trade-Bill Conferees Search for Toshiba-Ban Compromise, 45 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2813, 2813-14 (1987) (discussing deadlock over DoD review and Toshiba/Kongsberg
sanctions debate's role in it); see also supra note 167 (presenting Toshiba/Kongsberg affair).
200. See Congressional Conferees Clear Majority of Big Trade Bill, but Veto is Possible, Wall St.
J., Apr. 1, 1988, at 3, cols. 2, 4 (reporting conference committee's resolution of Toshiba/Kongsberg
matter, now reflected in 1988 OTCA, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2443, 102 Stat. at 1365-66).
201. Telephone interview with staffof Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade,
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs (Apr. 1988). The unilateral controls provision became subsection
2416(c)(2) of the 1988 OTCA, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2416(c)(2), 102 Stat. at 1351, which amends
EAA § 5(c), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), to require the elimination, within
fixed time limits, of controls that only the U.S. imposes.
The 1988 OTCA also contains a section that extends the EAA's authorization for one year,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2431, 102 Stat. at 1362 (amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (Supp. III 1985)),
and a section requiring another NAS report within 20 months of the OTCA's enactment, see id.
§ 2433, 102 Stat. at 1363-64.
202. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 655 (May 24, 1988); see H.R. 3
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tempt narrowly failed in the Senate.20 3 Both chambers swiftly reintro-
duced the same trade bill, without the plant closing provisions, as H.R.
4848.204 Late in the summer, the President acquiesced in a separate
plant-closing bill, and H.R. 4848 became law.2 0 5
C. The Congressional Intent Behind Section 10(g).
Since the 1988 OTCA makes no major changes to EAA section
10(g), the OTCA and its legislative history are relevant only insofar as
they help to resolve the ambiguities of section 10(g) or shed light on the
congressional intent behind DoD free-world license review.20 6 On the
first score, the OTCA is useless. The conference report on the trade bill
describes the Senate's position on section 10(g)(1)'s key phrase, "country
to which exports are controlled for national security purposes, ' 20 7 as "no
provision" (i.e., continued silence).20 8 Moreover, the report explains, the
conferees rejected the House's proposed amendment and accepted the
Senate's position "without prejudice to different interpretations of the
statutory authority for DoD to review exports to countries other than
controlled countries." 20 9 This statement shows that the 100th Congress
has recognized section 10(g)(1)'s ambiguity and has admitted its inability
to resolve it.210
(conference agreement), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 6401-6410, 134 CONG. REc. H1998-99 (daily ed.
Apr. 20, 1988) (the offending sections).
203. Byrd Move Keeps Trade Bill Alive, Wash. Post, June 9, 1988, at Al, col. 5.
204. H.R. 4848, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H5547-686 (daily ed. July 13, 1988),
introduced, 134 CONG. REc. H4427 (daily ed. June 16, 1988),passed, 134 CONG. REC. H5695 (daily
ed. July 13, 1985), placed on calendar, 134 CONG. REc. S9937 (daily ed. July 26, 1988).
205. The OTCA passed the Senate on August 3, 1988, one day after the President announced
that he would let the separate plant-closing bill, S. 2527, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC.
H5518-19 (daily ed. July 13, 1988), pass without his signature. See 134 CONG. REc. S10,731 (daily
ed. Aug. 3, 1988) (Senate passage of H.R. 4848); Plant-Closing Bill Enacted Without President's
Signature, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2226 (1988) (text of President's statement to Congress re-
garding S. 2527). Only a three-line notation appears in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments See 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1015 (Aug. 8, 1988)); see also Wehr, Reagan Bows to
Politics on Plant-Closing Bill, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2216 (1988) (explaining that Senate held
up trade bill to pressure President to allow S. 2527 to pass). The President signed the 1988 OTCA
on August 23, 1988. Remarks on Signing the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 in
Long Beach, California, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1077 (Aug. 29, 1988).
206. But cf. Starr, Conference on Statutory Interpretation-Observations About the Use of Legis-
lative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 376-79 (discussing practical shortcomings of legislative history
as interpretive tool).
207. EAA § 10(g)(1), (2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(1), (2) (1982).
208. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, supra note 185, at 823, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 1856; see supra note 193 and accompanying text.
209. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, supra note 185, at 824, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 1857.
210. Interestingly, the conference report's language on the unilateral controls provision that the
Senate accepted in exchange for the House's decision not to amend section 10(g)(1), see supra note
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On the second score, proponents of DoD free-world license review
might argue that the conference report, by reluctantly acknowledging
"different interpretations" of section 10(g)'s meaning,211 implies that the
1988 OTCA ratifies the Garn/Heinz interpretation.212 A careful reading
of all the relevant materials on the 1988 OTCA, however, suggests that
Congress has not decided whether to authorize the free-world license re-
view that the President ordered in 1985. First, the conference report dis-
cusses the President's 1985 directive as a "situation[ ] when other
departments [than Commerce] are included in specific licensing deci-
sions. ' 213 This passage in the report scrupulously avoids mentioning any
connection between the Commerce/DoD M.O.U.2 14 and EAA section
10(g).
Second, subsection 2425(b) of the 1988 OTCA demands a joint
Commerce/DoD study of the "redundancy and effectiveness" of concur-
rent review, "to provide a factual basis in order to evaluate the effect of
such joint review. ' 215 The language suggests that Congress will do the
evaluating and that no such evaluation has yet occurred.216 Finally,
Congressman Bonker's unrebutted remarks during the House debate on
the OTCA's conference report reiterate the report's point that Congress
has not yet agreed on DoD's role in free-world export license review:
Regrettably,... an important provision of the House bill to clarify the
role of the Department of Defense in reviewing exports to free world
destinations is not part of this conference agreement.... [The House
wanted] to clarify DOD's review of exports to controlled countries.
While the conference agreement does not contain such clarification,
the [House] committee reaffirms its strong belief that the statutory role
of the Secretary of Defense in reviewing export licenses is limited
201 and accompanying text, also reflects less than complete agreement between the Chambers. See
H.R. CONF. REp. No. 100-576, supra note 185, at 814, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 1847 (stating two different "understand[ings]" of maximum extension period for
unilateral controls under 1988 OTCA).
211. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (Garn/Heinz interpretation of section 10(g)).
213. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, supra note 185, at 824, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws at 1857.
214. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. The conference report gives the date of
President Reagan's directive as the date of the M.O.U., and only alludes to the directive as a "subse-
quent related documentfl." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, supra note 185, at 824, reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1857.
215. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, supra note 185, at 824, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 1857.
216. See id., reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1857. The inference that
Congress will evaluate DoD free-world license review arises implicitly from the conference report's
mention (in the sentence that defines Congress's role) of a slightly different role for the administra-
tion, see id., reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 1857, and explicitly from
Congressman Bonker's explanation of subsection 2425(b), 134 CONG. Rc. H2305 (daily ed. Apr.
21, 1988).
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to license applications for proposed exports to controlled countries
only .... 217
The House has done an admirable job of yielding, while claiming
not to yield, on the interpretation of section 10(g). The fact remains,
however, that three more years of DoD free-world license review have
passed since the House failed to oust the presidential directive in 1985.211
And despite its disapproval of the Senate's interpretation, the House has
just accepted "consideration" (i.e., the provision eliminating unilateral
controls) for its continued acquiescence.219 This acquiescence strength-
ens the authority for the 1985 presidential directive under a Steel Seizure
Case 220 analysis, possibly moving DoD free-world license review into
Justice Jackson's first category.221 Thus, as long as the language of sec-
tion 10(g) and the positions of the executive and legislative branches stay
the same, DoD free-world license review has an increasingly secure legal
foundation. 222
CONCLUSION
Despite the 1988 OTCA's failure to eliminate it, DoD's review of
free-world export licenses needs reappraisal. Admittedly, DoD's current
217. 134 CONG. REC. at H2305; see also id. at S4766 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Dixon) ("[Tihe Defense Department use [sic] its review to second guess decisions made by the Com-
merce and State Departments"); id at H2340 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Frenzel)
("I had hoped that duplicative review by the Defense Department could be eliminated on free world
license applications."); id at H2311 (statement of Rep. Bilbray) ("I felt that the House position was
a strong and fair one. .. ").
The conference report and Senator Dixon (D-Ill.) and Congressman Bonker's statements show
that, although the House and Senate have not reached agreement on the actual or desirable statutory
role for DoD, they do agree that DoD should not impose its view of foreign policy on the national
security export licensing process. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, supra note 185, at 824, re-
printed in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1857; 134 CONG. REC. at S4765-66 (daily ed.
Apr. 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Dixon); id. at H2305 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Bonker). In view of the interplay between foreign policy and national security in export controls, see
supra note 9, this agreement will probably benefit U.S. exporters very little, but it may stop DoD
from applying blatantly foreign-policy-related standards in the future. See, e.g., supra note 151
(describing one such standard).
218. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
220. 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); cf supra notes 125-34 and accompa-
nying text (analyzing how Congress's attitude toward President's 1985 directive affects its
constitutionality).
221. 343 U.S. at 635-37 (presidential action pursuant to Congress's express or implied authoriza-
tion); see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
222. This discussion assumes that the Executive and the Senate will continue to advocate DoD
review of free-world export licenses. Cf President's Announcement, supra note 61, at 412 (stating
President's position in 1984); White, supra note 20, at 339 n.1l (noting conflicting views within the
Reagan administration). The impending presidential election complicates such an assumption, as
does the likelihood of personnel changes in the 101st Congress. See id. at 345 (noting that Rep.
Bonker is running for the Senate in 1988).
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role has some support in EAA section 10(g)'s language and history,223
and as long as Congress stays ambivalent or deadlocked, it cannot call
the President's 1985 directive a usurpation.224
Nonetheless, many believe that giving DoD the right to review
West-West exports was, and is, bad national security policy. Recent re-
search supports that belief. As the GAO's 1986 study points out, DoD
rejects whole categories of proposed exports outright. When Commerce
refuses to go along, DoD often demands licensing conditions so onerous
that proposed exports disappear while the agencies negotiate.225 The
1987 NAS report shows how this situation harms U.S. exporters without
commensurately promoting national security.226
By calling for further study of DoD's role in export license re-
view, 227 the 100th Congress has hinted that a final resolution of the sec-
tion 10(g) issue lies ahead, possibly in connection with the EAA's
reauthorization in 1990. 228 Congress should take that opportunity to
heed the policy critics and exclude DoD from the free-world license re-
view process, if the next President has not already done so.229
223. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 121-40, 218-21, and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 154-63 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 5 (citing NAS panel's
view of how U.S. export controls aid foreign exporters), 175 (summarizing testimony before congres-
sional committees). But cf supra notes 163, 176-79, and accompanying text (criticisms of NAS
study).
227. See 1988 OTCA, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 2425(b), 2433, 102 Stat. 1107, 1360-61, 1363-64.
228. See id. § 2431, 102 Stat. at 1362 (amending EAA § 20, 50 U.S.C. § 2419 (Supp. III 1985))
(extending EAA's termination date to September 30, 1990).
229. If, in the face of presidential opposition, Congress limits DoD's license review power to
controlled-country exports, the President might simply countermand any statutory bar to DoD free-
world license review. See, eg., H.R. 3, supra note 173, § 332(n)(3), 133 CONG. Rac. at H2685
(forbidding mandatory referral of non-controlled-country export licenses to DoD); see also April
1986 Hearings, supra note 27, at 45 (statement of Rep. Bonker) ("If the executive branch can circu-
late a memo and... choose whatever directives it wants to assume greater responsibility or author-
ity, then why even have an Export Administration Act?"). But see Feldman, supra note 79, at 246
("The President does not need authority from Congress to direct his security advisers to vet the
actions of other executive departments,.., indeed, Congress may lack constitutional power to re-
strict him from so doing."). Mr. Feldman's theory, however, ignores Kendall v. United States ex reL
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838) ("[lit would be an alarming doctrine, that congress [sic]
cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper .. "). See L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 117-18 (1972) (discussing Kendall and its
implications).
When challenged in court, the President may claim that his inherent power over foreign affairs
allows him to control exports as he sees fit. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. This claim
would fail under Justice Jackson's analysis in the Steel Seizure Case: "When the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter." 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see
also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (endorsing Justice Jackson's analysis as
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Even if Congress disagrees with DoD's critics, it should at least
make section 10(g) a clear mandate for DoD free-world export license
review. DoD currently reviews free-world license applications based on
a classified presidential directive that has survived only because of Con-
gress's indecision. This leaves a highly controversial practice with a less
than certain legal foundation. The recent Transnautic fracas illustrates
the costs of uncertainty in export controls. These costs will continue to
mount until Congress decides how to balance control and competitive-
ness in West-West trade.
Matthew W. Sawchak
"useful"). Most would agree that Congress has "plenary" authority to regulate foreign commerce
under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 46
(1974) ("The plenary authority of Congress over both interstate and foreign commerce is not open to
dispute .... "). Consequently, the President has no residuum of extraconstitutional power, see
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936) ("[The investment of the
federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative
grants of the Constitution."), to uphold an export control directive at odds with statutory language
or congressional intent. Cf United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659-60 (4th Cir.
1953) ("[W]hatever the power of the executive with respect to making executive trade agreements
regulating foreign commerce in the absence of action by Congress, it is clear that the executive may
not through entering into such an agreement avoid complying with a regulation prescribed by Con-
gress."), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
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